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Qui Tam Actions for Citizen Enforcement of the
Refuse Act of 1899 Against Polluters
J. S. Ott*
IT MAY BE POSSIBLE for private citizens to enforce the Refuse Act
of 18991 when prosecutors refuse to act.2 This is possible, proponents
suggest, by applying the ancient theory of qui tam to criminal sanc-
tions in the Refuse Act. So far, the scheme has met with no reported
judicial approval.
History
A qui tam action is defined as:
A civil action brought by an informer, under a statute which
establishes a penalty for the commission or omission of a certain
act, and provides that the same shall be recoverable in a civil action,
part of the penalty to go to any person who will bring such action
and the remainder to the state or some other institution; and
is so called because the plaintiff states that he sues as well for
the state as for himself. A qui tant action is civil action.3 (emphasis
added)
Three sections of the Refuse Act 4 are applicable to the question
of whether a qui tam action lies. Section 407 defines the unlawful act:
It is unlawful to throw, discharge, or deposit from any ship, barge,
or floating craft or from the shore, "any refuse matter of any kind or
description whatever" into any navigable water or into any tributary
of any navigable water; neither is it lawful to place material on the
bank of a navigable water or tributary where it may be washed into
the water. "Refuse" includes all foreign substances and pollutants
apart from those "flowing from streets and sewers and passing there-
from into a liquid state into the water course."5
Section 411 establishes the penalty for violation of Section 407:
Every person and every corporation that shall violate, or that
shall knowingly aid, abet, authorize, or instigate a violation of the
provisions ... shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction
thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $2,500 nor less
than $500, or by imprisonment . . .for not less than thirty days
nor more than one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment,
in the discretion of the court, one half of said fine to be paid to the
persons giving information which shall lead to conviction.6 (emphasis
added)
0 B.A., Ohio State University; Fourth-year student, Cleveland State University College
of Law; employed in Public Relations Department, The Standard Oil Company (Ohio).
1 Section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 (30 Stat. 1151) is commonly called the
Refuse Act.
2 BRECHER AND NESTLE, ENViRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 229 (1970).
31 C.J.S. Actions § 23; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1414 (4th ed., 1951).
433 U.S.C. §§ 407, 411, 413 (1964).
5 U.S. v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 230 (1966).
63 3 U.S.C. § 411 (1964).
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Section 413 establishes the procedure for prosecuting alleged
offenders:
The Department of Justice shall conduct the legal proceedings
necessary to enforce the provisions...; and it shall be the duty
of the United States attorneys to vigorously prosecute all offenders
against the same whenever requested to do so by the Secretary
of the Army .... 7.
In attempting to perfect a qui taim action under the above pro-
visions, proponents rely in part on English history. English govern-
ments as far back as the Dark Ages, the 14th and 15th centuries, relied
upon citizen participation in law enforcement by authorizing qui tam
actions. This was due to the absence of adequate professional police
forces and an adequate prosecutorial administration, and often because
of Parliament's lack of confidence in the Crown's intention to enforce
the law.8 In this country, Mr. Justice Black noted in 1942, qui tam
suits have been "frequently permitted by legislative action, and have
not been without defense by the courts."9 The Supreme Court ob-
served in 1905:
Statutes providing for actions by a common informer, who
himself had no interest whatever in the controversy other than
that given by statute, have been in existence ... in this country
ever since the foundation of our government.'0
The court again recognized in 1943 that "qui tam suits have been fre-
quently permitted by legislative action . . . ."" A number of Federal
statutes authorize qui tam action by the common informer.12 As late
as 1970, the Hudson River Fisherman's Association was granted $2,000,
under the 1899 Rivers and Harbors Act, for exposing polluters of the
Hudson River.12a
The question is: Did Congress, by allowing the payment of one
half of the fine in Section 411, give citizens the right to bring qui tam
actions to enforce the Refuse Act?
Rationale Favoring Qui Tam Actions
The Conservation and Natural Resources Subcommittee report 3
encourages citizens to initiate qui tam actions. Such encouragement fol-
lowed a public exchange between the United States Justice Depart-
ment and Congressman Henry S. Reuss (D-Wis.), chairman of the
subcommittee. The dispute erupted in June, 1970, when Congressman
Reuss queried the Justice Department about its policy for enforce-
7 33 U.S.C. § 413 (1964).
9 U.S. House of Representatives, Conservation and Natural Resources Subcommittee of
the Committee on Government Operations, Qui Tam Actions and the 1899 Refuse Act:
Citizen Lawsuits Against Polluters of the Nation's Waterways 2 (1970).
9 Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 (1942).
10 Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905).
11 Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 (1942).
12 Supra note 8, at 3.
12a N. LANDAU & P. RHEINGOLD, THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 55 (1971).
13 Supra note 8, at 3.
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ment of the Refuse Act.14 In reply, Assistant Attorney General Shiro
Kashiwa wrote that it would not be in the "genuine interest" of the
federal government to prosecute a company which is discharging
refuse into a river but which also is spending large sums to secure
abatement of that pollution under a federal agency's program. Mr.
Kashiwa wrote:
It is patent that the Refuse Act is not and cannot be the
weapon of choice in the armament of antipollution law in all in-
stances; thus, prosecutive discretion is always essential and must
take into account the possible effects which the use of the Refuse
Act might have upon the programs of other agencies concerned
with the broad program. 15
Congressman Reuss replied:
If the Justice Department winks at the industrial polluter who
violates ... the Act, there will be no incentive to get a Corps (of
Engineers of the United States Army) permit and comply with
water quality standards as the law requires. . . . It is folly to
allow the polluter regardless of the sums of money he may be
spending now for pollution abatement, to disregard the prohibi-
tion against such discharges under the Refuse Act.16
In July, 1970, the Justice Department solidified the position
enunciated by Mr. Kashiwa. The department disclosed "guidelines"
limiting antipollution suits United States Attorneys may bring under
the 1899 Refuse Act. The guidelines encourage United States Attor-
neys "to punish or prevent significant discharges, which are either
accidental or infrequent," but they may not on their own use the act
to punish or prevent significant discharges which are "of a continuing
nature resulting from the ordinary operations of a manufacturing
plant.' 7 The guidelines assert that the latter type of discharges are
"precisely the type that Congress intended the Federal Water Qual-
ity Administration should handle." The guidelines further state the
Justice Department policy is "not to attempt to use the (Refuse)
Act as a pollution abatement statute in competition with the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act."'3
Conservation forces reacted vigorously. Among the most vocal
was Congressman Richard L. Ottinger (D-NY), who threatened a suit
to compel the United States Attorney General to enforce the 1899
Refuse Act against industrial polluters. He called the Department of
Justice guidelines 9 a "double standard of law enforcement.
'20
141 BNA ENVIRONMENT REPORTER: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 157 (1970).
15Id. at 158.
1' Id. at 138.
t7 Id. at 288.
Is ld.
19 The following provisions of the guidelines relate directly to citizen actions:
8.A. Since citizens who supply information relating to violations of the Refuse Act may
be entitled to be paid one half of the fine collected upon conviction for such violation,
United States Attorneys will keep records of all actions initiated pursuant to informa-
tion supplied by citizens keeping in mind that they may be called upon to recommend
to the court for or against payment of bounties.
(Continued on next page)
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In September, 1970, Congressman Reuss' subcommittee reported
on qui tam actions as a means of citizen enforcement of the Refuse
Act:
In this country today, when the Justice Department is appar-
ently reluctant to vigorously enforce the Refuse Act, the citizen
informer who brings a civil qui tam suit under the Act performs
a very useful and essential function. 21 The report adds that the
Corps of Engineers, which investigates alleged violations, and
the Department of Justice, which prosecutes them, do not have
funds or personnel "to do battle in court with the thousands of
industries in this country which are unlawfully discharging wastes
into our navigable waters ...."2 The report also notes, referring
to the English Dark Age heritage, that qui tam statutes were first
passed "in circumstances such as this."
23
Judicial Response to Attempted Enforcement of the
Refuse Act Through Citizen Lawsuits
Since October, 1970, there have been four qui tam actions reported.
Each has been dismissed.
Durning v. ITT Rayonier, Inc. 24 was a suit by a Seattle attorney
and his wife on behalf of the United States against a paper company
under the criminal provisions of the Refuse Act. Plaintiff contended
that the last clause of Section 411 granted him the right to sue, claim-
ing the Congressional enactment implied that a civil action by an in-
formant is permissible if the informant seeks to receive his "bounty."
In a brief opinion, Judge Goodwin held:
This court concludes that Congress in enacting this criminal
statute intended to reward an informant leading to the conviction of
the wrongdoer and not to provide a means by which an informant may
proceed to recover against the violator of the criminal statute the
amount he might otherwise receive from a fine which "might" be
imposed after conviction of the defendant in a criminal proceeding.
If plaintiff's contention is correct, the court would be in the awk-
ward position of determining priority between a criminal prosecu-
tion by the United States through the United States Attorney
and a civil suit under the same action by an informant. It would
(Continued from preceding page)
S.B. Where a United States Attorney is advised by a citizen of an alleged violation of
which he already has notice, he shall promptly so advise the citizen.
S.C. Citizens who in general terms inform the United States Attorney of Refuse Act
violations should be advised that they can be eligible to receive the bounty provided
for under the Act only upon their supplying specific information concerning the alleged
violations, which information is either used as the basis for a criminal complaint or
in the trial of the case, and results in a conviction and the levying of a fine.
9. United States Attorneys should take no position with respect to, or seek to intervene
or appear as amicus curiae in any qui tam action which may be brought under the
supposed authority of the Refuse Act.
I BNA ENVIRONMENT REPORTER: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 157 (1970).21Id. at 157.
21 Supra note 8, at 11.
22 Id.
22 id.
242 BNA ENVIRONMENT REPORTER: DECISIONS 1170 (W.D. Wash. 1970).
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be unreasonable to conclude that a court would entertain both
actions simultaneously and consecutively. 25 (emphasis added)
The court in Bass Anglers v. U. S. Steel26 used a great deal more
legal analysis in arriving at its decision that there was an absence of
any right in the plaintiff to maintain the action under Sections 407
and 411 of the Refuse Act. "Plaintiff relies solely upon the last phrase
of Section 411 allowing a person furnishing information leading to
conviction to share in any fine imposed as a basis for implying some
private right of enforcement," the court wrote. "Such an implication
runs counter to the clear import of the statute which establishes a
reward but not a right of private enforcement." 27
In a per curiam decision, the three-judge court held: (a) Crim-
inal statutes cannot be enforced by civil actions. The court cited
United States v. Claflin,27a, which dealt with violation of an importa-
tion statute, and the government brought an action of debt against the
defendant. The court held, "That Act contemplated a criminal pro-
ceeding, and not a civil action of debt. It imposed a penalty.... It is
obvious, therefore, that its provisions cannot be enforced by any civil
action . . Any attempt to impose criminal sanctions by way of
civil procedures raises serious constitutional problems dealing with
double jeopardy, the court in Bass Anglers v. United States Steel noted.
(b) Criminal statutes can only be enforced by the proper author-
ities and a private party has no right to enforce these sanctions.
Keenan v. McGrath,2 8& explains:
Not only are we unaware of any authority for permitting a
private individual to initiate a criminal prosecution in his own
name in a United States District Court, but also to sanction such
a procedure would be to provide a means to circumvent the legal
safeguards provided by persons accused of a crime, such as arrest
by an officer on probable cause or pursuant to a warrant, prompt
presentment for preliminary examination by a U. S. Commissioner
or other officer empowered to commit persons charged with of-
fenses against the United States .... 29
(c) Plaintiff's denomination of the suit as a qui tam action does
not give him a right to enforce a criminal statute. The court noted
that plaintiff cited many cases but none approved a qui tam action
to collect a criminal fine. All involved civil penalties or forfeitures.
The right of qui tam action originates in statute, rather than from a
statutory right to share in the penalty. It arises from "the express or
implied statutory grant of authority to maintain the action. '30
25 1d. at 1171.
26 Bass Angler v. U. S. Steel, 2 BNA ENVIRONMENT REPORTER: DECISIONS 1204 (D. Ala.
1971).
27 Id. at 1205.
27s97 U.S. 546 (1878).
28 id. at 547.
28a 328 F. 2d 610 (1st Cir. 1964).
29 Id. at 611.
3 Bass Anglers v. U. S. Steel, 2 BNA ENVIRONMENT REPORTER: DECISIONS 1204, 1206 (D.
Ala. 1971).
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(d) Even where some statutory language seems to grant a private
right of action, if the same or a related statute also clearly places en-
forcement in the hands of governmental authorities, the right of action
is exclusively vested in such government authority. 31 Of course,
Section 413 vests the authority for enforcement in the United States
Department of Justice.
Bass Anglers v. U. S. Plywood32 analyzed the factual-legal relation-
ship much as the Alabama court did in the previous case, and it dis-
counted an additional argument advanced by plaintiff. Although Sec-
tion 411 does not specifically authorize the qui tamn action, plaintiffs
argued that it does not specifically deny the action either and under
these circumstances should be construed to impliedly authorize such
a suit. Plaintiffs cited Justice Black's dictum in United States v. Hess:33
Statutes providing for a reward to informers which do not
specifically either authorize or forbid the informer to institute
the (qui tarm) action are construed to authorize him to sue.
"Justice Black's dictum would appear to state the law too broadly,"
Judge Seals wrote. He held that qui tam action depends entirely upon
statutory authorization, as it has never found its way into the common
law. Furthermore, he wrote that Justice Black's construction "ob-
viously is inappropriate," unless the statute is silent as to whether
the qui taim action is authorized, and nothing can be gleaned concerning
congressional intent from the circumstances surrounding the passage
of the statute.3 4 Judge Seals held that the language of Section 411 of
the Refuse Act indeed rules out the qui tam proceeding, for the statute
provides that the informer is entitled to part of the fine only upon
the conviction of the person violating Section 407:
The informer's rights depend upon (1) a criminal proceeding
being brought under Section 411; (2) a conviction being obtained
in the criminal proceeding; and, (3) the convicting court imposing
the fine as punishment for the offense. The informer's rights there-
fore are entirely dependent upon and inseparable from the crim-
inal proceeding brought by the Department of Justice, the party
authorized to institute such suit. Clearly, then, the qui tan civil
action is not authorized.3 5
Congressman Reuss' personal lawsuit to institute a qui tam action,
Reuss v. Moss-American,3 6 also was dismissed for failure by plaintiff
to show standing to sue. The court relied upon analyses in Durning v.
ITT Rayonier, Inc. and the two Bass Anglers cases in arriving at its deci-
sion.
31 Id.
82 2 BNA ENVIRONMENT REPORTER: DECISIONS 1299 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
.33 Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 at n. 4.
34 Bass Anglers v. U. S. Plywood, 2 BNA ENVIRONMENT REPORTER: DECISIONS 1298, 1301
(S.D. Tex. 1971).
35 Id.
36 2 BNA ENVIRONMENT REPORTER: DECISIONS 1259 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
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Conclusion
Americans have recognized in the last few years a general en-
vironmental crisis. As Judge Seals noted in Bass Anglers v. U. S.
Plywood,37 there is a growing realization that the ecological scales are
in danger of being so uncontrollably tipped, if they have not already
been so disturbed, that all life forms, including man, will perish. There
is a popular demand that the accelerating trend of environmental de-
gradation be abated and where feasible, reversed. President Nixon
has repeatedly urged that we must "act now."3 8 From 1968 to 1970
some 500 bills and amendments dealing with environment issues were
introduced in Congress. One commentator wrote that this is without
doubt the highest concentration of Congressional fire on a single issue
ever experienced within such a short period of time. 9
Against this groundswell of popular and political support, zealous
proponents of environmental programs have turned for satisfaction
to the judicial system when various legislative and administrative
agencies have failed to react either favorably or with apparent
urgency. This would seem to be the situation regarding the theory
of instituting qui tam actions to enforce criminal sanctions of the
Refuse Act. The United States Department of Justice, charged with
prosecuting alleged offenders of the Refuse Act, was not prosecuting
with enough vigor to satisfy some persons anxious to end industrial
pollution of navigable waters. Neither was the Corps of Engineers,
which is charged with gathering evidence to prosecute, moving ex-
peditiously enough. The Justice Department had indicated a reluctance
to transgress into an area of enforcement it felt Congress had reserved
for the Federal Water Quality Administration. Proponents turned to
the courts for a speedy remedy in the form of qui tam actions.
The courts, singularly unimpressed by political theatrics (i.e., "do
battle in court with thousands of industries"40 ), have applied sound
legal reasoning in rejecting the qui tam theory as it was being related
to Refuse Act enforcement. Criminal statutes cannot be enforced by
civil actions; criminal statutes can only be enforced by the proper
authorities and a private party has no right to enforce these sanctions;
the right of qui tam action originates in statute, rather than from a
statutory right to share in the penalty; if the statute clearly places
enforcement in the hands of government authorities, the right of action
vests exclusively in that authority. 41 This writer found no authority
which would diminish the viability of these legal doctrines.
37 2 BNA ENVIRONMENT REPORTER: DECISIONS 1298, 1299 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
38 State of the Union Message, January 22, 1970; remarks in St. Louis, Missouri, June 25,
1970, before United States Junior Chamber of Commerce.
39 Farrell, Let the Polluter Beware, 75 CASE AND COMMENT 3 (1970).
40 Supra note 8, at 11.
41 Bass Anglers v. U. S. Steel, 2 BNA ENVIRONMENT REPORTER: DECISIONS 1204 (D. Ala.
1971).
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Notwithstanding the need for halting or reversing pollution of
the nation's waters, the position of the courts is highly desirable as
public policy. The possible consequences of allowing private citizens,
in effect, to become public prosecutors by enforcing criminal statutes
through civil lawsuits could be extremely prejudicial to the defend-
ant's rights,42 and could raise serious constitutional questions.43 The
proper avenue for enforcement is through administrative officers, and
if these officers or their organizations fail to perform their duty to
the satisfaction of citizens there is proper legal and legislative remedy
available. It would be folly for the judicial system to support weak
legal authority, as has been advanced in favor of qui tam actions to
enforce the Refuse Act of 1899, in view of the strong legal author-
ity to the contrary, and the fact there is appropriate remedy avail-
able, albeit less expeditious.
42 Keenan v. McGrath, 328 F. 2d 610 (1st Cir. 1964).
43 Bass Anglers v. U. S. Steel, 2 BNA ENVIRONMENT REPORTOR: DECISIONS 1204 (D. Ala.
1971).
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